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A SONG OF ICE AND FIRE: OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATES AND 






Offshore methane hydrates have recently made headlines as various 
countries began experimenting with methods of exploration and 
extraction of the resource. The value and abundance of this resource 
presents many exciting opportunities as researchers and developers 
begin to contemplate the possibility of commercial development of 
methane hydrate reserves. This Comment seeks to explore the legal 
regulations in place and assess whether the current legal regime, both 
in the United States and internationally, would be able to efficiently 
regulate methane hydrates and their unique composition due to 
difficulties stemming from exploration and extraction. In particular, 
this Comment will look at how to impose liability after an accident 
resulting from exploration and extraction of offshore methane 
hydrates. Ultimately, because of their unique nature and the narrow 
focus of current legal institutions that govern liability of off drilling 
accidents, this Comment recommends the institution of different 
liability standards to successfully cover the unique problems inherent 
with Offshore methane hydrates. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Take a chunk of this stuff up to the surface[,] and it looks and 
feels much like ice, except for a give-away fizzing sensation in the 
palm of your hand, but put a match to it and it doesn’t just melt, it 
ignites.”1 This statement is referring to a chemical known as a methane 
hydrate, more colloquially known as “fiery ice.”2 The substance, most 
commonly found in the ocean, has been of interest to many in the 
energy world because of its potential to alleviate the tensions caused 
by the depleting reserve of fossil fuels and potable water.3 Scientists 
speculate that methane hydrates may be able to produce more energy 
than the current estimation of reserves of fossil fuels with one-third of 
the carbon footprint.4 In 2013, Japan made a large stride in developing 
 
 1. Martha Henriques, Why ‘Flammable Ice’ Could be the Future of Energy, 
BBC (Nov. 22, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20181119-why-flammable-
ice-could-be-the-future-of-energy [https://perma.cc/6SFU-V6UG]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. Hiroko Tabuchi, An Energy Coup for Japan: ‘Flammable Ice’, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/business/global/japan-says-
it-is-first-to-tap-methane-hydrate-deposit.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/RG39-P9VB]; Martha Henriques, Why ‘Flammable Ice’ Could be 
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strategies for efficient and safe extraction and exploration of methane 
hydrates.5 This experimental expedition gave Japan and other 
countries hope that this resource may become a commercially viable 
alternative to coal and natural gas as a world leader in energy.6 Upon 
the conclusion of the maiden voyage of Japan’s extraction of methane 
hydrates, a senior researcher remarked, “[n]ow we know that 
extraction is possible.”7 Japan also conducted a second test in 2017 
and was able to successfully run the well for 24 hours without 
incident.8 While many applaud the innovative developments that are 
beginning to pave the way for offshore methane hydrates to become a 
sustainable source of energy, others believe methane hydrates are 
more detrimental than they are beneficial. “We are waking up the 
methane dragon. And that’s a dragon we really want to keep in the 
box.”9 Those who ascribe to Samantha Joye’s apocalyptic notions 
regarding methane hydrates and their commercial development posit 
that the extraction of the resource will emit greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere, and as a general matter, that extraction has the capacity 
to produce catastrophic results.10 Some critics even believe an 
innocuous misstep in exploration or extraction could lead to a 
tsunami.11  
Perhaps more concerning is the lack of legal framework in 
place for these future events. The commercial development for 
exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates is becoming 
an inevitable certitude. As countries and private companies alike begin 
to put structures in place for economic development purposes, a legal 
 
 5. See Hiroko Tabuchi, An Energy Coup for Japan: ‘Flammable Ice’, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/business/global/japa 
n-says-it-is-first-to-tap-methane-hydrate-deposit.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/RG39-P9VB]. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Martha Henriques, Why ‘Flammable Ice’ Could be the Future of Energy, 
BBC (Nov. 22, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20181119-why-flammable-
ice-could-be-the-future-of-energy [https://perma.cc/6SFU-V6UG]. 
 9. Chris D’Angelo, Chasing the Methane Dragon That Lurks in The Deep Sea, 




 10. See id. 
 11. Martha Henriques, Why ‘Flammable Ice’ Could be the Future of Energy, 
BBC (Nov. 22, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20181119-why-flammable-
ice-could-be-the-future-of-energy [https://perma.cc/6SFU-V6UG]. 
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framework is essential to guide and regulate the exploration and 
extraction of offshore methane hydrates. With this framework, it is 
imperative to recognize international laws that establish a legal 
governance in a global context. This Comment will examine domestic 
and international laws that would govern the extraction and 
exploration of offshore methane hydrates in the United States, with a 
particular lens on how liability is assessed in the wake of an offshore 
accident. Specifically, this Comment will highlight the particular 
problem of what type of liability standard is best suited to handle the 
dangerous nature inherent in offshore methane hydrate exploration 
and extraction. Finally, this Comment will look at the current legal 
framework and determine whether a new framework would provide a 
better structure for efficient, safe, and environmentally sound 
exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates. Part II of this 
Comment will expand upon intricacies of the resource itself, outlining 
the chemical components and putative role it can play in solving 
problems such as the lack of energy and water. Additionally, Part II 
will enumerate the hazards connected to the extraction of methane 
hydrates in the ocean that create obstacles for future economic 
viability. Part III will survey the domestic laws that impose obligations 
for offshore spills and accidents. Part IV will look at the international 
obligations currently in place and their specific relation to the United 
States, with a particular focus on the United Nations Convention for 
the Law of the Sea. Part IV will provide an analysis of the current 
landscape and pose that robust additions be made to the United 
Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea and the International 
Seabed Authority’s Mining Code to ensure that liability can be 
assessed internationally. Part V will provide a way forward, giving 
thoughts on a normative regime that could govern offshore methane 
hydrates in a way that allows companies to enter the market and ensure 
a forum to compensate victims. Finally, Part VI will provide a 
summation of the main points of the Comment and concludes.  
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II. WHAT IS A METHANE HYDRATE? 
A. Allow Me to Introduce My Friend, Methane Hydrates 
Methane hydrates have many denominations. They have been 
referred to as natural gas hydrates, gas clathrates, or clathrates.12 
Methane hydrates are composed of two ingredients: fresh water and 
pure natural gas.13 Under the right circumstances, the water forms 
“tiny ice cages” around the individual methane molecules, while 
simultaneously forcing out any other salt or acid molecules.14 Because 
excess materials are forced out of the compound molecule, the end 
result is a methane hydrate with the ability to produce both fresh water 
and natural gas.15  Methane hydrates are predominantly made of water, 
consisting of roughly 85% water and 15% methane gas.16  Methane 
hydrates are created and best thrive in low temperatures.17 
Furthermore, they are best formed under high pressures and also 
require high pressurization to remain stable.18 Despite their icy or 
slushy appearance, methane hydrates are stable in temperatures 
ranging from negative five degrees Celsius to positive thirty-four 
degrees Celsius, or from twenty-three degrees Fahrenheit to ninety-
three degrees Fahrenheit.19 Both biological and non-biological 
processes can create methane hydrates.20 Methane is usually produced 
biologically as a product of waste from microorganisms as they 
consume biological material.21 Methane can also be produced non-
biologically through spontaneous decomposition of organism matter, 
which tends to occur only when the temperature of the organic 
material exceeds 100 degrees Celsius; however, this process is 
 
 12. Roy Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus: Planning Ahead for the Commercial 
Development of Offshore Methane Hydrates, 15 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 16, 
17 (2015) [hereinafter Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus]. 
 13. ROY ANDREW PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE 
METHANE HYDRATE OPERATIONS: CIVIL LIABILITY AND REGULATIONS FOR 
EFFICIENT GOVERNANCE 13 (Kurt Deketelaere ed., 2017) [hereinafter PARTAIN, 
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE OPERATIONS]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 16. 
 17. Id. at 18. 
 18. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 17. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Erin Jackson, Fire and Ice: Regulating Methane Hydrate as a New Potential 
Energy Source, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 611, 613 (2014). 
 21. Id. 
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relatively uncommon.22 Methane hydrates are typically found in two 
distinct locations. The first is permafrost regions, and the second is 
below the sea floor.23 When methane hydrates exist offshore, they 
usually form and are found within the first 200 kilometers of the 
shoreline.24 Offshore methane hydrates can sometimes be found as 
shallow as 150 meters; however, the natural resource is most 
commonly found more than 500 meters below the sea floor.25  
B. A People’s History of Offshore Methane Hydrates 
Scientists have known about methane hydrates for over two 
centuries; however, the substance known to them at the time was one 
created in a laboratory and not one found in nature.26 The biological 
methane hydrates found below the sea floor have remained a largely 
unknown resource until recently.27 The first methane hydrate gas field 
was discovered in 1964 in Siberia.28 The first survey was taken in 
1970, and eleven years later, the first attempt to recover the resource 
was made.29 It was not until the 1990s, however, that methane hydrates 
finally became recognized as an energy resource that could potentially 
and feasibly be commercially developed.30 The first offshore methane 
hydrate well was drilled in 1999.31 It was only six years ago when 
Japan produced a methane hydrate well that could flow continuously, 
and it was only two years ago when they produced a well that could 
continuously flow for more than twenty-four hours.32 Because 
methane hydrates are relatively new and unproven, there is uncertainty 
regarding its economic viability in the future.33 The Japanese 
government has speculated that commercial exploration of offshore 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE 
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 26. 
 25. Jackson, supra note 20, at 613. 
 26. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE 
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 13. 
 27. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 16. 
 28. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE 
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 14. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 16. 
 32. Tabuchi, supra note 4; Henriques, supra note 1. 
 33. Tabuchi, supra note 4. 
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methane hydrates may occur as early as 2023.34 Others are less 
optimistic about the proposed timeline and believe the ability to 
develop the natural resource commercially will take much longer.35 
Despite claims that the government’s estimations are overly 
ambitious, Japan may have more of an impetus to create the 
technology to commercially extract methane hydrates in an 
economically viable manner.36 Countries like Japan and South Korea 
lack other forms of natural gas and typically incur extra costs 
connected with importing energy to their country; thus, these countries 
may have more incentive to begin to produce methane hydrates 
commercially.37 Despite the fact that the United States has the ability 
to rely on other forms of energy, the excitement surrounding methane 
hydrates has not diminished.38 The head of methane hydrate research 
for the United States Department of Energy has stated that production 
of methane from methane hydrates deposits has been feasible since 
2005.39 Dr. Carolyn Ruppel, despite her preface that she does not carry 
around a crystal ball, believes that a long-term extraction experiment, 
lasting months to a full year, could occur by 2025.40 Many hope that 
these statements, in conjunction with one another, show that 
commercial feasibility is coming in the very near term.41 
C. Future Potential Benefits of Offshore Methane Hydrate Extraction 
1. Global Abundance of the Natural Resource 
What makes methane hydrates so desirable as a putative 
alternative to other fossil fuels is its sheer abundance in the global 
context. Scientists originally speculated that the methane hydrate 
reserves would only be double the size of other fossil fuel reserves; 
however, others now have realized that this figure was a “very 
conservative understatement.”42 The most recent estimates have 
 
 34. Henriques, supra note 1. 
 35. Id. 
 36. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE 
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 14. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 16. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Henriques, supra note 1. 
 41. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 16. 
 42. Tabuchi, supra note 4; PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM 
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varied considerably; however, one survey took a collection of the 
varied estimates and found that most estimates are currently assuming 
at least a hundred-fold, if not more, increase over conventional fossil 
fuels.43 One survey speculated that there would be enough producible 
methane hydrate reserves to provide the entire globe with sufficient 
energy supplies for a millennium.44  
Not only is there a large quantity of the resource where it 
exists, but it also appears to exist across the globe. Estimates state that 
there are currently seventy locations where methane hydrate reserves 
have been identified.45 In essence, methane hydrate fields have been 
found across almost every coastline.46 This should be juxtaposed with 
current oil and gas fields, which are limited both in quantity and 
location.47 Because of the seeming surplus of methane hydrates across 
the globe, many countries will be able to become subsistence energy 
producers, providing both revenue and affordable energy to their 
economies.48 While not all countries would have access to methane 
hydrates, the number of resource owners is drastically larger than 
those who currently own traditional fossil fuels.49  
A complicated issue, and one that is beyond the ultimate scope 
of this Comment, is that the commercial development of offshore 
methane hydrates could create a further disparity of wealth between 
coastal states and those that are landlocked.50 Countries with access to 
methane hydrate deposits will benefit from the profits, unlike those 
countries that do not have access to it.51 Furthermore, impoverished 
countries that do have access to offshore methane hydrates; may be 
more willing to let private companies exploit the resource with limited 
legal restrictions in place.52 The lack of legal restrictions would attract 
companies that are seeking to limit their liability, especially 
 
OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 19. 
 43. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE 
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 19. 
 44. Id. at 21. 
 45. Jackson, supra note 20, at 614. 
 46. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE 
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 26. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 28. 
 49. Id. at 29. 
 50. Id. at 28. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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considering the inherent dangers present with methane hydrate 
exploration and extraction.53 The danger with this model is that it 
could create a proverbial “race to the bottom” between nations whose 
economies are in need of financial stability; therefore, companies 
would extract the methane hydrate resource without any structure in 
place to enforce liability.54 The lack of governance over the 
exploration and extraction of methane hydrates could prove damaging 
to the country’s marine life, and companies could avoid liability for 
any catastrophic damage caused from potential methane leakage or 
landslides.55  
When discussing the putative economic benefits of offshore 
methane hydrates, it is important to consider what is stopping private 
companies from investing enough capital to ensure that commercial 
development becomes a reality. Some have speculated that the 
commercial development of methane hydrates would be a complete 
“game changer” in global energy markets, providing substantial 
benefits to national and global economies.56 Others are more 
recalcitrant, believing that an incentive to develop technology to 
commercially produce methane hydrates will not become prevalent as 
long as shale gas continues to be a major player in the energy 
industry.57 The main argument stemming from this line of thought is 
that producing shale is currently less expensive than producing 
methane from hydrates.58 The cost of producing shale has decreased 
dramatically in recent years, and the possibility that the cost of 
methane hydrates also decreases is equally as plausible.59 If that 
reduction in costs occurs, a “tidal wave” of energy production could 
flood the American markets, causing a shock in the markets larger than 
the previous surprise caused by shale gas.60 Furthermore, while 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See infra Part II.D. 
 56. Edward Dodge, Methane Hydrates are a Promising Energy Resource, 
BREAKING ENERGY (Feb. 10, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://breakingenergy.com/2015/02 
/10/methane-hydrates-are-a-promising-energy-resource/ [https://perma.cc/B7HH-
6F9P]. 
 57. Clare Foran, Is Methane Hydrate the Energy Source of the Future?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 24, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/is 
-methane-hydrate-the-energy-source-of-the-future/444258/ [https://perma.cc/995A-
SZ5N]. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Foran, supra note 57; Dodge, supra note 56. 
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America is “awash with natural gas,” other countries, like Japan, are 
forced to import most of their natural gas, and production of hydrates 
could contribute to the global economy from an import standpoint.61 
Another benefit of the methane hydrate is the amount of water 
that could be produced and utilized from the resource. As previously 
stated, roughly 85% of a methane hydrate is water.62 The water 
extracted from methane hydrates would be available for both 
consumer and agricultural uses.63 The extracted water would take little 
treatment, if any at all, to become potable.64 The potential for the water 
of a methane hydrate to become potable water could go a long way in 
alleviating the tension caused by the global drought and the 
predictions of water scarcity in the next twenty years. Some have 
treated the water portion of a methane hydrate as a disposal cost, or 
something that inhibits the extraction of the methane gas.65 However, 
given that global drought may currently constitute a “slow-moving 
natural disaster,” the water retrieved from methane hydrates may assist 
in a more immediate capacity, considering that there are current 
reserves for traditional fossil fuels.66  
2. Offshore Methane Hydrates: A Greener Future? 
The next logical question, then, is so what? Are we merely 
replacing the devil we know with the devil we do not? In the very least, 
methane hydrates would alleviate the tension caused by depleting 
conventional fossil fuels. At current levels of global consumption, 
traditional natural gas consumption forecasts enough reserves to last 
roughly fifty years.67 Beyond that, however, methane hydrates may be 
 
 61. Nicola Jones, The World Eyes Another Unconventional Source of Fossil 
Fuels, YALE ENV’T 360 (Aug. 21, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/the-world-
eyes-yet-another-unconventional-source-of-fossil-fuels-methane-hydrates 
[https://perma.cc/B5UZ-YRF2]. 
 62. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE 
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 51. 
 63. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 19. 
 64. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE 
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 51. 
 65. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 19. 
 66. Michon Scott & Rebecca Lindsey, 2017 State of the climate: Global drought, 
CLIMATE.GOV (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-
images/2017-state-climate-global-drought [https://perma.cc/S4AH-KA5X]. 
 67. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE 
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 20. 
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a quasi-green energy source. Scientists familiar with the resource 
believe that methane hydrates would produce only one-third of the 
carbon amount that traditional fossil fuels produce.68 Comparatively, 
a methane hydrate is a “sweet” natural gas that contains relatively few 
impurities.69 Methane would not, therefore, produce significant 
pollution beyond the possible greenhouse gases, that can be dangerous 
to human health like coal.70 In addition, unlike coal, methane does not 
produce ash and other carcinogenic materials.71 
While significantly reducing the carbon footprint of producing 
energy is appetizing, it may not provide the long-term results 
necessary to sufficiently reduce carbon emissions. There is, however, 
a potential solution to carbon emission present in the extraction of 
offshore methane hydrates. The process is known as carbon capture 
and sequestration, and, in essence, is a process by which the methane 
component of the icy lattice structure is replaced with carbon dioxide, 
thereby converting the extraction process into a carbon neutral or 
carbon negative activity.72 Other researchers have attempted to 
harness the carbon by-product from extraction to attempt to generate 
electricity.73 
D. Risks Inherent in Offshore Exploration and Extraction of Methane 
Hydrates 
There are numerous dangers that accompany the process of 
exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates. For many, 
assuming technological innovation allows for methane hydrates to 
become a pragmatic alternative energy source, the potential 
environmental benefits far outweigh the risks associated with the 
exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates.74 Others, 
however, are more reticent to perform this type of cost-benefit analysis 
and believe methane hydrates, even left to their own devices, are 
inherently dangerous.75 Methane, as a gas, currently accounts for 
 
 68. Henriques, supra note 1. 
 69. Partain, Avoiding Epimetheus, supra note 12, at 19. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE 
HYDRATE OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 51. 
 75. D’Angelo, supra note 9. 
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roughly 20% of all human-caused planetary warming.76 Samantha 
Joye has referenced methane hydrates as a “ticking time bomb,” and 
her fears stem from the notion that rising ocean temperatures will force 
methane hydrate structures to destabilize, causing a large release of 
methane into the atmosphere.77 Other scientists believe these 
apocalyptic notions are a bit jejune in nature; Dr. Carolyn Ruppel has 
noted that over 95% of methane hydrates exist more than 1000 meters 
below sea level, making a release of methane gas into the atmosphere 
very difficult.78 In fact, Dr. Ruppel believes that any methane that 
seeped from 1000 meters below sea level would dissolve before it 
reached the surface.79  
Despite the conflicting understandings of the dangers of 
methane hydrates, it is evident that there are risks inherent and unique 
to the resource that would be exacerbated upon exploration and 
extraction that are not present with the production of other traditional 
natural gases.80 Unlike traditional oil and gas, which is found deep 
under the secure, rocky seabed, methane hydrates are found on 
slopped mud beds that are at risk of slipping.81 Due to the nature of 
methane reserves existing on slopped sea beds in the ocean, there are 
numerous ways in which the exploration and extraction process could 
present environmental hazards.82 The two prevalent risks that stem 
from exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates are non-
cataclysmic and cataclysmic events.83  
A few prominent, non-cataclysmic hazards that have been 
identified are the release of methane into the ocean, impacting 
surrounding underwater fauna, and other disturbances on the seabed 
that can negatively impact fisheries and other underwater life.84 These 
risks, already present from methane seepage, would only be 
exacerbated by disturbing the mud bed during the exploration and 
extraction process.85 The methane released during the extraction 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE 
HYDRATE OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 57. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 66. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. at 72. 
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process could present a problem of toxicity to marine life in 
surrounding habitats.86 The release of methane could further present a 
problem if conditions were present for the gas to reach the ocean 
surface.87 Methane that reaches the surface is called “swamp gas” and 
presents visible bubbling and burping at the water’s surface.88 In some 
instances, the methane reaching the surface has been so concentrated 
that it has killed livestock and humans.89 Furthermore, some scientists 
have speculated that a massive disturbance forcing methane to the 
water’s surface could disrupt the buoyancy of a boat and force that 
boat to sink.90 
While non-cataclysmic events pose a constant threat due to the 
release or seepage of methane, a cataclysmic event brought on by 
extraction of methane hydrates could create large-scale damages to 
coastline communities.91 As mentioned above, methane hydrate 
reserves located on slopped mud beds allows the reserve to be easily 
disturbed.92 The exploration and extraction of methane hydrates could 
allow the mud bed structure to lose its integrity, forcing a large-scale 
mudslide in the ocean. The impact of a potential mudslide could result 
in either a large release of methane gas or an “earthquake-like impact 
such as a tsunami.”93 Extraction of this resource presents a problem 
because it disassociates the methane hydrate structure in one part of 
the deposit, which in turn creates more pressure in other parts of the 
deposit.94 This level of instability, if it generates enough energy, can 
force large-scale natural disasters.95 It should be noted here that not all 
deposits are created equally; methane hydrates found in shallow 
waters—depths of 400 meters and below—would generally lack the 
conditions to yield a landslide.96 Furthermore, the deeper the mud 
layer over the deposit, the safer, as a general matter, the methane 
hydrate is from a cataclysmic event.97 Thus, the key to alleviating the 
 
 86. See id. at 72–73. 
 87. Id. at 69. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 70. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See generally id. at 76. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 78. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 79. 
 97. Id. 
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potential dangers that exist with the extraction of methane hydrates is 
to determine the safest deposits available for extraction.98 
It is evident, given the risks enumerated above, that the 
exploration and extraction of offshore methane hydrates presents 
issues that are vastly different than the current risks inherent in 
exploration and extraction of traditional oil and gas and the legal and 
regulatory frameworks that guide them. In addition, scientists have 
stated that a large, contributing factor to the widescale damages caused 
by the Deepwater Horizon Spill in 2010 can be attributed to the 
“corruption of the containment dome” by methane hydrates.99 While 
oil spills can produce damage to individuals and the marine 
environment, that damage does not compare to the damages 
contemplated by offshore methane hydrate accidents. Thus, it is 
imperative to outline the current structure for regulating oil accidents, 
focusing particularly on liability and compensation, and determine 
whether a new regulatory scheme should be put in place to account for 
the large-scale damage that may ensue if an accident were to occur. 
III. ASSESSING LIABILITY FOR DRILLING ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Typically, liability and risk of offshore exploration and 
extraction are discussed in three separate categories.100 The first 
category contains the preventative measures that are in place to 
attempt to eradicate or alleviate the potential for a spill.101 These 
measures typically come in the form of regulatory schemes both 
publicly by states, countries, and international bodies as well as those 
that are self-imposed by the oil and gas companies.102 From there, the 
second category tends to be the reactionary measures in place once a 
spill occurs. In essence, the question here is whether a government or 
private company has plans in place to effectively clean up a spill once 
 
 98. Id. at 87. 
 99. Zack Colman, Should the World Tap Undersea Methane Hydrates for 
Energy?, SCI. AM. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/shoul 
d-the-world-tap-undersea-methane-hydrates-for-energy/ [https://perma.cc/8SP6-
EWMU]. 
 100. See generally MANAGING THE RISK OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ACCIDENTS 
(Günther Handl & Kristoffer Svendsen eds., 2019). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
  
2021] A SONG OF ICE AND FIRE 275 
 
it occurs.103 Finally, the third category discusses how victims affected 
by the spill will impose liability.104 The last category focuses mostly 
on assessing damages and ensuring the culpable parties adequately 
compensate the victims.105  
While this Comment focuses primarily on the liability aspect 
of managing the risks of offshore methane hydrates, it is imperative to 
note that all three categories are necessary for effective regulation of 
methane hydrates. While a prevention strategy governing methane 
hydrates is important and necessary for the efficient, safe extraction of 
the resource, a strong liability regime is more favorable based on the 
inherent nature of methane hydrates. Often, accidents occurring are 
not a matter of if, but when. Despite the regulatory body’s best 
attempts to allay destruction, an accident may be inevitable. For this 
reason, there should be more of an impetus on a liability regime, which 
is the focus of this Comment. The Author notes, however, that the best 
approach is ultimately for both categories to be present. Furthermore, 
robust activity in all three categories, or rather a “belt and suspenders” 
approach, can provide a complimentary regime that could both enable 
private companies to explore and extract methane hydrates, thus 
providing a global benefit by making this resource available, and 
ensure that anyone affected from a potential spill will be sufficiently 
compensated for any loss or damage that occurs.106 
In the United States, there are two distinct avenues to pursue a 
claim due to an oil spill or other offshore drilling accident. The first 
avenue is through tort liability, and the second is through the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990.107 Tort law in this area is a well settled principle 
pursuant to the precedent established in the early 20th century, which 
has since been affirmed by courts in the wake of the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster.108  
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A. Robins Dry Dock and its Heirs 
The seminal case in determining liability in maritime 
negligence claims is Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.109 The 
case was a libel action filed by time charters of a steamship against the 
dry dock to recover for the use of the steamer due to the defendant’s 
negligence in injuring the steamships propeller.110 In a contract 
between the two parties, the steamship would be docked every six 
months, at which point the defendant negligently injured the propeller, 
resulting in the need for a replacement.111 The court ultimately 
determined the damage came from the delay caused by having to make 
repairs on the propeller, and that would be “a wrong to no one except 
for the [defendant’s] contract with the vessel owners.”112 The court 
continued to say that, as a general rule, “a tort to the person or property 
of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely 
because the injured person was under a contract with that other 
unknown to the doer of wrong.”113 The court also stated that justice 
does not permit the defendant to be charged with the loss unless there 
is someone who has a claim in either contract or tort.”114 “Most courts 
have concluded Robins Dry Dock has become the pillar for 
establishing a bright-line rule for damages recoverable under the 
general maritime law for unintentional maritime torts.”115 In essence, 
most courts have come to believe that Robins Dry Dock stands for the 
proposition that parties are barred from recovering any economic loss 
without an accompanying property loss.116  
A prime example of this bright-line rule can be seen in In Re 
Deepwater Horizon, a case occurring in the wake of the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill.117 In a parenthetical, the Fifth Circuit noted, “This 
circuit and others have interpreted Robins Dry Dock to mean that there 
can be no recovery for economic losses caused by an unintentional 
maritime tort absent physical damage to property in which the victim 
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has a proprietary interest.”118 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s holding that the three Mexican States who filed complaints 
alleging damages as a result of the oil spill did not hold a sufficient 
proprietary interest in the allegedly damaged property, and therefore 
were barred from recovery.119 This holding presents multiple issues: 
the first being that foreign countries may be barred from recovery 
based on a lack of uniformity in the laws. The second, and perhaps 
more problematic, is that at one point after the Macondo Well incident, 
over 99% of claims filed with the Trust Administrator in the BP spill 
were for lost earnings, whereas only 1% related to property damages 
caused by the spill.120 In the realm of torts, it appears that these 
claimants would be without any judicial reprieve. Enter the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990. 
B. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (the “Act”) was a direct response 
to the Exxon-Valdez Spill that occurred in 1989.121 The Act was 
intended to provide quick cleanup of spills and allow compensation of 
victims of such spills.122 In addition, the Act clarified which damages 
were compensable and softened the causation standard.123 Perhaps the 
main departure from the traditional tort method of recovering losses 
in this arena was that the Act allowed victims who experienced pure 
economic loss due to an oil spill to bring a cause of action regardless 
of proprietary ownership.124 Furthermore, the Act imposes strict 
liability on parties responsible for the discharge of oil on navigable 
waters.125 The imposition of strict liability implies a duty is inherent 
to the nature of the work.126 Now, plaintiffs will not need to prove that 
an activity occurred negligently, rather they will merely need to prove 
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the activity occurred.127 While the Act facially appears to provide an 
avenue for more victims to bring suit for any perceived tortfeasors, it 
is unclear whether victims have in fact filed more claims because of 
the Act.128 The Act appeared to relax the causation standard. However, 
by using the phrase “due to” and omitting any language requiring a 
proximate cause, the Act creates uncertainty regarding its ultimate 
intent.129  
First, it can be demonstrated that factual causation is required 
to bring a claim under the statute.130 “In other words, it must be proved 
that the claimant sustained pure economic loss, such as lost profits, 
and/or impairment from earning capacity ‘due to’ natural resource 
damage, which ‘resulted from’ an oil spill in navigable waters.”131 The 
seemingly simple standard may in fact be difficult to prove and costly 
to litigants; to establish a factual connection, one may need a forensic 
accounting of events as well as “in-depth[,] local[,] economic 
knowledge before and after the spill.”132 The issue of proximate cause, 
however, is less certain. The statute providing the liability standard 
does not explicitly determine the causation standard, and no court has 
specifically determined the intent of the statute on this matter.133 One 
judge opined that the causation standard “may lie somewhere between 
traditional ‘proximate cause’ and simple ‘but for’ causation.”134 Other 
authors have argued that the statute only articulates a “but for” test of 
causation, but this test is further limited by both the scope and purpose 
of the statute and the explicit monetary limit on damages imposed by 
Congress.135 The scope and purpose argument diminishes the question 
of proximate cause and eliminates the need for a foreseeability 
inquiry, which would prevent further ambiguity in the statute.136 
Further, the absence of a proximate cause standard within the statute, 
when the standard is present in other federal statutes imposing 
liability, is also telling.137 The proximate cause language appears one 
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time in an exception provision dealing with the removal of the liability 
cap.138 The lack of explicit proximate cause language demonstrates 
Congress’s intent to leave that standard out of the analysis for liability 
under the Act.139 
Second, and perhaps more important, Congress provided an 
explicit limit on cause-in-fact liability by instituting monetary caps on 
recovery.140 The monetary cap ensures that recoveries do not exceed 
the explicit dollar limit.141 In particular, the cap is based on different 
categories that each tanker or drilling rig would fall into.142 For 
instance, an oil tanker that is 100,000 tons would be liable for up to 
$120 million.143 The monetary caps represent two policies that are 
inextricably and inherently at odds with one another.144 On one hand, 
a monetary cap allows different companies to enter the market with 
the knowledge and certitude of their putative liability from a spill. On 
the other hand, the monetary cap would effectively reduce the 
recovery amount awarded to a class of plaintiffs affected by the 
spill.145  
In these instances, where civil liability rules appear to be short-
sided, the presence of regulatory rules is imperative to ensure that 
drilling companies are compliant with safety and environmental 
standards.146 An effective regulatory scheme helps to alleviate the 
tension caused by the issues implicit in the monetary cap regime of the 
Act.147 The liability structure in the United States appears to work in 
most cases, except with regard to victims who suffer a pure economic 
loss. The ultimate issue is that any accident stemming from the 
extraction of methane hydrates could potentially wreak havoc to the 
extent that the monetary cap would prevent numerous victims from 
being compensated for their loss. Clearly, a monetary cap on liability 
would not be the best regime for the extraction of offshore methane 
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hydrates as it would leave many victims without a forum for their 
cause of action.  
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAWS GOVERNING DRILLING ACCIDENTS 
Given the complexity and uncertainty around liability in the 
United States for offshore oil spills, one must consider whether there 
are any international conventions or treaties that provide and enforce 
liability to offshore accidents. Many oil spills, by their ability to reach 
waters beyond specific territorial boundaries, “become international 
events.”148 A robust and unified international scheme could provide 
and enforce liability to offshore accidents in ways that individual 
country regimes could not. A review of the current international laws 
will further demonstrate that a stronger international convention is 
needed, especially in dealing with offshore methane hydrates. Experts 
have articulated that there are currently “large gaps in what the 
international agreements cover.”149 In the wake of the BP spill, many 
have reflected that a spill infiltrating international waters would 
further reveal the large holes in the international regulations.150 Due to 
the erratic and perhaps dangerous nature of methane hydrates, it is 
imperative to have a cogent and unified regulatory system in place to 
ensure recompense for any issues that may arise. 
A. United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea 
The most prominent reform in property rights over 
international waters came from the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea in 1982, which created the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).151 UNCLOS divided 
the sea into distinct territorial zones, each subject to different legal 
status.152 Most importantly for the extraction of methane hydrates, 
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UNCLOS established that the first 200 nautical miles off the coast 
would be the Exclusive Economic Zone of each state, unless other 
states’ boundaries conflict with that measurement. For purposes of 
determining liability for offshore methane hydrate accidents, 
UNCLOS’s important effect relates to the duties and standards to 
protect the marine environment set forth by the international 
agreement.153 Currently, over 168 nations have ratified the treaty; 
however, the United States is not one of them.154 The United States, 
despite not ratifying the treaty, has signed the document and has 
agreed to follow the principles of UNCLOS because they crystalize 
customary international law.155 When proposing the convention to the 
different nation states, Ronald Reagan announced that the United 
States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off their 
coasts pursuant to both the convention and customary maritime law.156 
Customary international law is widely recognized as a binding source 
of international law, when two elements are met.157 The first element 
is state practice, which can be defined as any act or statement by a 
state.158 The second element, Opinio Juris, requires a belief that the 
act is legally necessary or that the nation conducts themselves out of a 
sense of legal obligation.159 In essence, the United States is bound by 
customary international law principles codified in UNCLOS; 
therefore, the international convention has bearing on a conversation 
regarding offshore resources in transboundary areas.  
Part XII of UNCLOS and, more specifically, Article 192 
provide an obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment.160 Furthermore, countries that are a part of UNCLOS are 
required to “ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are 
conducted so as not to cause damage by pollution to other [countries] 
and their environment.”161 UNCLOS requires the development of 
regulatory systems prior to the commercial development of methane 
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hydrates.162 “Rules, regulations[,] and procedures shall be drawn up in 
order to secure effective protection of the marine environment from 
harmful effects directly resulting from activities in the ‘Area’ if 
undertaken with regards to the exploitation of minerals, such as 
methane hydrates.”163 The “Area” is a reference to the area outside of 
the exclusive, economic zone that belongs to everyone and should be 
mined for the benefit of mankind.164 Finally, if an operator causes 
harm because of an offshore accident, they will be liable for the actual 
amount of damage.165 According to Professor Roy Partain, “UNCLOS 
has sufficient ambit to regulate the development of the methane 
hydrates. [T]here would need to be a new set of regulations and rules 
to establish proper safety practices and methods of handling 
environmental damages. Such rules and regulations currently do not 
exist.”166 
B. The International Seabed Authority 
The International Seabed Authority (“ISA”) is an authority 
established by UNCLOS to regulate mineral extraction from 
international waters.167 In particular, the ISA is in the process of 
promulgating the Mining Code, which is intended to cover all 
environmental, financial, reporting, and regulatory obligations 
incurred by “seabed mining operations.”168 The ISA originally 
anticipated that the Mining Code would be published in 2020; 
however, the timetable has been pushed back as it has taken more time 
to develop exploitation regulations.169 Currently, the ISA is inviting 
delegates to send written comments on draft exploitation regulations 
 
 162. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE 
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 194. 
 163. Id. 
 164. A Glance at the Mining Code, DSM OBSERVER, 
https://dsmobserver.com/2017/07/glance-mining-code/ [https://perma.cc/ZX7Q-
NW2H]. 
 165. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM OFFSHORE METHANE HYDRATE 
OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 194. 
 166. Id. 
 167. A Glance at the Mining Code, supra note 164. 
 168. Id. 
 169. International Seabed Authority Under Pressure Over Deep-sea Mining 




2021] A SONG OF ICE AND FIRE 283 
 
for their meeting in February of 2020.170 In that same invitation, the 
ISA called for proposals to study an environmental compensation fund 
in the context of minerals in the “Area.”171 The proposal recognizes 
that in the current system, a company or operator will only be liable to 
the extent that the damage occurring arises out of a wrongful act.172 
The proposal is an attempt to establish a trust fund that would 
compensate victims when a state is not considered liable.173 It is also 
clear that the ISA is aware and has contemplated the extraction of 
offshore methane hydrates; in assembly notes from 2008,  the ISA 
mentioned the innovations put forth by Japan in experimenting with 
the resource.174 The question then is whether a compensation fund will 
be able to compensate victims from offshore methane hydrate 
exploitation accidents. Given the amount of damage that is possible, it 
is unclear whether a compensation fund could cover the extensive 
claims brought by the innumerable putative victims, especially when 
a state actor is not liable. 
C. International Maritime Organization and the Civil Liability 
Convention 
Adopted in 1948 at an international conference in Geneva, 
Switzerland, the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) was 
formally established to improve the safety of the sea by developing 
international regulations.175 The IMO has produced many conventions 
regarding the safety of the sea; however, one main convention 
promulgated by the IMO, the Civil Liability Convention (“CLC”), 
may provide some insight into the international regulation of offshore 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Int’l Seabed Auth. [ISA], Call for Proposals for a Study on an 
Environmental Compensation Fund in the Context of Exploitation of Minerals in the 
Area, ¶ 4, at 1 (Feb. 5, 2020), https://ran-s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fs-
public/files/documents/ecf.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KDJ-QU5J]. 
 172. Id. ¶ 3, at 2. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Int’l Seabed Auth. [ISA], Report of the Secretary-General of the 
International Seabed Authority Under Article 166, Paragraph 4, of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. ¶ 101, (June 6, 2008), https://ran-
s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fs-public/documents/EN/14Sess/Ass/ISBA-
14A-2.pdf [ https://perma.cc/CW8A-CRWR]. 




284 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
methane hydrates. It should be noted that, currently, the CLC would 
not apply to offshore methane hydrates;176 however, the convention 
may provide an understanding to how regulations for offshore 
methane hydrates may be successful. Notably, the CLC provides strict 
liability in the sense that reasonable care cannot shield the owner from 
liability and eventual repayment of damages.177 Furthermore, the CLC 
typically puts liability squarely on the owner, with some exceptions.178 
Facially, the CLC allows for pure economic loss; however, it is often 
curtailed by a “scope and purpose” inquiry that inhibits full recovery 
from loss.179 Under the CLC, salmon farmers, fishers, divers 
maintaining salmon cages, ice producers supplying salmon farmers, 
and box manufacturers have been able to bring claims against oil and 
gas companies.180 Ironically enough, employees at fishing plants were 
unable to bring claims of lost wages because their hours were reduced 
due to accidents that damaged the fish market.181 This contradiction 
demonstrates that some pure economic loss claims are honored, 
whereas others are deemed too attenuated to receive compensation. In 
this regard, it appears that the CLC is narrower than the OPA in the 
sense that it does not allow secondary or relational claims to be 
brought.182 
With relative uncertainty with the CLC and a lack of a 
substantive framework within UNCLOS regarding liability of 
offshore accidents, it is no wonder that many have advocated for a 
uniform, international regime instituting liability for offshore 
accidents.183 Though many private companies do their best to create 
their own regulatory policies, an international, public, regulatory 
scheme “will become necessary in the future.”184 In addition, 
unilateral regimes like the one in the United States may not provide 
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the most efficient means of enforcing liability and may even be 
“damaging to the international economy.”185 In the very least, it is 
profoundly evident that a uniform, international scheme is necessary 
when methane hydrate exploration and extraction becomes 
commercially viable.  
V. PROPOSED REGULATORY ENACTMENTS 
It is evident that the novel nature of offshore methane hydrates 
presents risks that are not currently contemplated by the regimes in 
place regulating offshore oil and gas exploration and extraction. “The 
risks of cataclysmic accidents are unique to the specific operations of 
offshore methane hydrate fields…”186 It is therefore imperative to 
implement a uniform scheme that can handle the risks inherent in 
offshore methane hydrates.  
First, the principles of strict liability should govern the 
regulatory scheme, rather than the principles of negligence or the 
modified strict liability seen in the United States. There are dueling 
policies when discussing the two different regimes. First, a negligence 
standard provides a safe harbor for energy players who are 
determining the risks before entering the market. Given the dangerous 
nature of offshore methane hydrates, different companies may be 
reluctant to waste money researching a way to commercially develop 
the resource that provides too much liability to the activity. Given the 
unique potential for danger, a negligence standard would prevent 
victims from having a forum as long as the energy actors are acting 
reasonably during the exploration and extraction. Ultimately, given 
the dangers associated with offshore methane hydrate exploration and 
extraction and the potential for unfathomable damage stemming from 
putative accidents, a strict liability standard without monetary caps or 
other causation standards is preferable because it ensures that victims 
will be able to secure judgments for damages that occur.  
Second, given the ubiquitous nature of the offshore methane 
hydrates across the globe, the ideal solution is to implement the strict 
liability standard through an international convention. The difficulty 
in countries unilaterally determining laws is that the accidents caused 
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by offshore methane hydrates have the capability of moving beyond 
territorial waters, thus becoming an international issue. Implementing 
a strict liability standard to govern offshore methane hydrates provides 
uniformity and reliability in the sense that other nation states will not 
be without a forum if an international accident does occur.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
It has been the earnest attempt of the Author to apprise the 
reader of the energy resource known as methane hydrates and their 
global abundance. In addition, their chemical composition presents an 
opportunity to the global energy market that could theoretically 
replace other types of oil and gas as the march for renewable energy 
presses onward. With these exciting opportunities, however, there are 
real and present dangers that are inexorably intertwined with the 
commercial development of offshore methane hydrates. These 
complex hazards, in conjunction with the lack of certitude regarding 
how liability will be assessed when an accident occurs, have been a 
major barrier to energy in the offshore methane hydrate market. This 
Comment presented regulatory and liability rules governing offshore 
oil and gas accidents in the United States and how liability is assessed 
in international regimes in hopes of determining whether major 
changes are necessary to incorporate methane hydrates. Currently, the 
hybrid form of strict liability in the United States does not allot for 
pure economic loss and is limited by monetary caps and causation 
standards. Furthermore, while UNCLOS may have the teeth to enforce 
international liability, there are no specific regulations that allow it to 
do so, and the Mining Code promulgated by the ISA is not currently 
in force and may not encompass the issues presented by offshore 
methane hydrates. It is evident that, given the dangerous nature of 
offshore methane hydrate exploration and extraction, a strict liability 
standard should be adopted internationally and enforced through 
UNCLOS and the ISA to ensure uniformity of the rules and provide 
an avenue for victims to bring claims against the private companies.  
 
